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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW REVIEW
Volume LIII February, 1951 Number 2
THE EVIDENTIARY EFFECT OF A VIEW: STARE DECISIS
OR STARE DICTIS?*
THOMAS P. HAmRDAN**
T HERE can be no doubt that the West Virginia decisions are
quite confusing if not conflicting as to the extent to which a
view by a trier of fact is usable as substantive evidence. Indeed,
in the latest important case in point (apart from a recent decision
as yet unreported), our court frankly admitted that with respect
to this problem there is a "lack of harmony in our cases which
(said the court, per Kenna, J.,) we think should be commented
upon."' In that case, however, the court did not consider it neces-
sary to extend its comments far enough to resolve the disharmony.2
Accordingly it is the purpose of this discussion to examine the
principal cases in point, in an effort to determine whether our
seemingly inconsistent decisions can be harmonized.
To begin with, it must be conceded that many West Virginia
lawyers seem to believe that a view is not substantive evidence but
is something which is usable, ancillarily only, to enable the trier of
fact, whether jury or judge,' to understand the record evidence.
* Address, (written version) delivered at the annual meeting of the West
Virginia Judicial Association, October 6, 1950.
** Dean of the College of Law, West Virginia University.
I [The recent West Virginia case referred to, supra, within brackets (and
officially unreported as of the time of going to press) is Frampton v. Consolidated
Bus Lines. That case was decided after this address was delivered, but a brief
bracketed comment on the case is included, infra, in the body of this paper.]
The above-quoted remark by Kenna, J., is from State v. Sanders, 125 W. Va.
143, 148, 23 S.E.2d 113, 115 (1942).
2 See, e.g., Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Fox, 58 S.E.2d 584, 593 (W.
Va. 1950), in which our court said that "the view is not in all respects evidence."
3 The question whether a judge sitting without a jury may have a view
and whether what the judge so observes is usable as substantive evidence does
not seem to have been judicially decided in this jurisdiction. No reason is
perceived, however, why a judge so sitting may not have a view in this state
or why what he observes should be treated differently in this regard from
situations in which the trier of fact is the jury. See 4 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 1169
(3d ed. 1940).
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EFFECT OF A VIEW
Moreover, this belief is unquestionably buttressed by certain lan-
guage employed by our court in several cases, particularly in the
more recent opinions. But notwithstanding all this judicial lan-
guage, e.g., the oft-repeated statement in the syllabus in Chesapeake
& Ohio Ry. v. Allen4 that "The view is not to furnish essential
evidence dehors the record", the question remains: What is the
West Virginia law on the subject? Stare decisis-or stare dictis?
Which raises, of course, the basic question: What is law?-a
question which must be answered, consciously or unconsciously, in
any serious attempt to ascertain what the law is as to any particular
problem. What, then, is law-case law? Or, to put the inquiry
somewhat more concretely, how do we determine as a practical
matter what the law is on any particular point? Is the law of a
case, or the law of a series of related cases, what the court of last
iesort "says" as a supposedly necessary part of its reasoning in the
latest pertinent case or cases? Or is law something more than that?
Mr. Justice Holmes, one of the greatest of American judges,
has given us what is perhaps the most famous general answer to
these questions. He says, "The prophecies of what the courts will
do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the
law."5 This classic statement must be interpreted in the light of
Holmes' many other utterances on the question to mean that law
is made up of the various bases of prophecy as to what the courts
will do in fact. In somewhat similar vein, Mr. Justice Cardozo has
advocated what may be called "the prediction theory" as to the
nature of law. "A principle or rule of conduct so established as
to justify a prediction with reasonable certainty that it will be
This method of evidencing the facts of a case has been found to be a very
helpful one in other states, e.g., in Massachusetts where, as in West Virginia,
the only pertinent statutory provision purports to authorize a view by the jury,
or by jury and judge, but is silent as to a view by a judge sitting without a
jury. In holding that a judge sitting without a jury could take a view 'of the
scene under such a statute, the Massachusetts court said: "The power to inform
itself by a view, within or without the territory of its jurisdiction, is inherent
in a court at common law. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1162, 1163, and notes thereto.
... In this Commonwealth the power is conferred by statute, G.L. (Ter. Ed.)
c 234, § 35, upon courts sitting with juries in languages broad enough to avoia
any implication that it is confined to jury cases and to courts which sit with
juries." See Madden v. Boston Elevated Ry., 284 Mass. 490, 188 N.E. 234 (1933).
Similarly, too, in an interesting federal case in the southern district of
West Virginia, in a decision by the late Judge McClintic, the judge personally
took a view of the scene and concluded tht on his own examination and from
the (other) evidence, an alleged fact was "impossible". See United States v.
Fanning, 6 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.W. Va. 1934).
4 113 W. Va. 691, 169 S.E. 610 (1933).
5 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. Rzv. 457, 461 (1897).
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 2 [1951], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol53/iss2/2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
enforced by the courts if its authority is challenged, is, then, for
the purpose of our study, [says Cardozo 6] a principle or rule of
law."
To be sure, as Dean Pound has ably pointed out, there are to
be found in the cases other bases of prophecy-other legal elements
than "a principle or rule of conduct"-which may become, in the
language of Mr. Justice Cardozo, so well established as to justify a
prediction with reasonable certainty that they will be judicially
enforced if their authority is challenged.7 One of these other
authoritative bases of prediction-and the ony one which it is
feasible to include in this discussion-is what Pound calls the
technique element in the law as distinguished from the precept
element, namely, the authoritative technique of the courts and
administrative tribunals in interpreting and applying rules, prin-
ciples, and other legal precepts.9
It may be said therefore that law is made up of the various
authoritative bases of prediction as to what courts and administra-
tive tribunals will do in fact; and, sufficiently for present purposes,
these bases of prophecy consist of (1) what the courts and adminis-
trative tribunals say as an essential part of their reasoning with
respect to the precise point or points actually and necessarily adjudi-
cated,' 0 and (2) what these tribunals do in fact (their technique of
thinking and acting) in pursuance or in purported pursuance of
what they thus say in their opinions, or, indeed, in their syllabi."'
Moreover, in evaluating these two bases of prediction in the per-
tinent cases, it will be helpful to bear in mind another instructive
0 CARDozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 52 (1924).
7 See POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMNION LAW 1 (1921): "The common
law . . . is essentially a mode of judicial and juristic thinking, a mode of
treating legal problems rather than a fixed body of definite rules." POUND, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 115 et seq. (1922); Pound, The
Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 641, 643-653 (1923); Pound What
Is Law? 47 W. VA. L.Q. 1. Cf. Hardman, Judicial Technique in Using the Agency
Relation, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 133 (1930); Hardman, "The Law"--In West Virginia,
47 W. VA. L.Q. 23 (1940).
8 As to the third class of legal elements, viz., legal ideals, see Pound, The
Ideal Element in American Judicial Decision, 45 HARv. L. REv. 136 (1931);
Pound, A Comparison of Ideals of Law, 47 HARv. L. Rlv. 1 (1933); Pound,
What is Law? 47 IV. VA. L.Q. 1 (1940).
9 See authorities and articles cited note 7 supra. See also Pound, The Ad-
ministrative Application of Legal Standards, 44 A.B.A. REP. 445, 454-458 (1919);
POUND, OUTLINE OF JURISPRUDENCE 76-77 (5th ed. 1943).
10 See GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1921), especially
chapters 9, 10, 11.
11 See, e.g., Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
As to whether a judicial statement in the syllabus is per se "law" in West
Virginia, see the article and comments cited note 17 infra.
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observation by Mr. Justice Holmes. "If you want to know the law
and nothing else," says Holmes, "you must look at it as a bad man,
who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge
enables him to predict ... 12 All of which is one way of stating,
inter alia, that what the court says must be interpreted and weighed
in the light of what the court does-that "law in action" is generally
more important than so-called "law in books"; that the life of the
law lies in its enforcement? 3 If what the court says by way of a
legal precept is outweighed by what the court does in fact-by the
court's technique of interpretation and application of the precept-
so that the judicial utterance is not such as to justify a prediction
with reasonable certainty that it will be enforced by the courts if
its authority is challenged, then the judicial statement does not
rise to the full stature of law: it is only a dictum.
The first and leading case dealing with the evidentiary effect
of a view in this jurisdiction is Fox v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry.14 In
that case, an action brought for the purpose of recovering damages
due to the construction of a railroad upon a street on which the
plaintiff's dwelling fronted, the jury had taken a view of the locus
in quo, and the court was asked to give an instruction to the effect
that the jury must disregard all impressions they received from a
view of the premises. This the court refused to do, and this refusal
was assigned as error. But our supreme court approved the action of
the lower court, and, in doing so, the court said, "To instruct...
[the jury] to disregard everything they saw, and every impression
they received from the view, would be to mislead them, because it
is apparent that the view would be absolutely useless, and would
not conduce to a 'just decision', if both sight and apprehension
were to be closed against the results naturally to be derived from an
inspection of the premises."'1
It should be pointed out, however, that the court also said, in
a sentence immediately preceding the language just quoted, that
"the object of ... [a] view must be to acquaint the jury with the
situation of the premises, and the location of the property, so that
they may better understand the evidence." But, it should be noted,
this language does not necessarily conflict with the language used
by the court in the subsequent passage in which the court clearly
12 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
13 See, e.g., Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. Rnv. 12
(1910); Pound Enforcement of Law, 20 GPXN BAG 401 (1908).
14 34 W. Va. 466, 12 S.E. 757 (1890).
'5 Id. at 480, 12 S.E. at 762.
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expressed the principle that a view is substantive evidence.
Interestingly, the later cases which purport to sponsor the so-
called ancillary theory that a view is not evidence generally rely
on the last mentioned language from the Fox case rather than on
the subsequent and final expression of the court.16 It is submitted,
however, that the subsequent expression of the court reflects the
true ratio decidendi of the case, for that expression, and that expres-
sion only, squares fully with the actual holding in the case. More-
over, without subscribing to the theory that the syllabus is the law
in West Virginia (a theory to which the writer does not subscribe
for reasons which he has elsewhere expressed at some length in the
pages of this Law Review' 7 ), it should be mentioned that the syl-
labus in the Fox case strongly supports the proposition that a view
is real evidence. Point 4 of the syllabus in that case-the only lan-
guage in the syllabus that is pertinent-reads as follows: "When the
jury have been properly permitted to view the premises in dispute,
it is not improper to refuse a request which requires the Court to
instruct the jury that 'they are not to take into consideration any-
thing they saw or any impression they received at the view of the
premises.!"
The next case seems to be State v. Henry8 a murder case in
which the jury had, apparently, viewed the scene of the killing.
There was a verdict of guilty, and it was contended that the trial
court had erred in that it had not instructed the jury (on its own
motion) "that they should not consider as evidence any of the
objects or locations pointed out to them upon the grounds." But
the supreme court not only affirmed the action of the lower court
but said, citing the Fox case, that "such an instruction is not proper
under the decisions of this Court." In other words, the court said
in effect that it is error to instruct the jury that a view is not evi-
dence. And yet, surprisingly, State v. Henry has been cited as
authority for the ancillary theory. 19
16 See, e.g., State v. Sanders, 125 W. Va. 143, 148, 23 S.E.2d 113, 116: "It
will be noted that in this utterance [quotation from the Fox case] this Court
indicated that the effect of a view is to be limited to its secondary relationship
to the evidence properly introduced in the case on trial."
17 See Hardman, "The Law"-In West Virginia, 47 W. VA. L.Q. 23 (1940);
"The Syllabus Is the Law", 47 W. VA. L.Q. 141 (1941); "The Syllabus Is the
Law"-Another Word, 47 W. VA. L.Q. 209 (1921); "The Syllabus Is the Law"-
Another Word by Fox, J., 48 W. VA. L.Q. 55 (1941).
18 51 W. Va. 283, 41 S.E. 439 (1902).
19 See Doman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 125 W. Va. 8, 12, 22 S.E.2d 703,
705 (1942).
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Then came the case of Guyandot Valley Ry. v. Buskirk, 20 a
condemnation proceeding, in which our court unequivocally
espoused the theory that a view is in every respect evidence. Said
the court: "On the question of value, the jury may rest the verdict
largely upon their own knowledge derived from a view of the
premises.21
The next case of any consequence is State v. McCausland,22
a murder case in which the jury viewed the scene of the alleged
crime. Although a verdict of guilty was set aside by the supreme
court on the ground that an experiment was conducted during the
view in the absence of the accused, our court strongly advocated
and adopted the theory that a view is substantive evidence. Said
the court in what is undoubtedly the most exhaustive judicial ex-
pression in this jurisdiction, "Frequently in the trial of . . . cases
material objects are introduced before the jury . . . Can it be said
that that this is not evidence? It is stronger and more convincing
to the jury than the oral testimony of any witness could possibly be.
There can be no difference in the proffer of objects to the jury in
the court room and such exhibition by taking the jury to view such
objects, when they are not susceptible of being brought into court.
The reason the jury is taken to view the ground is simply because
it is physically impossible to bring it into the court room, and it is
therefore necessary, in order that the jury may have all of the light
obtainable upon the subject to which the inquiry is directed, that
it be taken and shown these objects which form a part of the sub-
ject of inquiry. In this case can it be doubted that the actual
demonstration made upon the ground to show whether or not cer-
tain objects were visible from a certain point was the strongest
sort of evidence that could be introduced upon that question? Like-
wise, the view of the jury was the very strongest evidence as to the
distance between the scene of the tragedy and the place where the
witness was standing whose testimony was questioned. A dozen
witnesses might testify that they observed this tragedy from a cer-
tain point, and the jury would not believe a single one of them, if
from the observation made upon the ground the physical conditions
were such as to preclude the possibility of the truth of the witnesses'
20 57 W. Va. 417, 50 S.E. 521 (1905).
21 Id. at 430, 50 S.E. at 526.
22 82 W. Va. 525, 96 S.E. 938 (1918).
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statements. This view is fully sustained by what we consider the
better authorities." 23
The court also wrote the following syllabus in the McCausland
case:
"'... A view is for the purpose of informing the jurors
upon any pertinent inquiry being made in the trial of the case,
and the things which they observe upon such view, so far as
they are pertinent to show anything proper to be proved, are
to be considered by them the same as any other evidence
introduced in the case."
The next West Virginia case worthy of comment is Harvey v.
Huntington,24 a condemnation proceeding in which the jury was
taken to view the property. In upholding a verdict based in part
on this inspection, the court said: "The view of the jury was the
very strongest evidence."25
Then followed Clay County Court v. Adams, 26 a condemnation
proceeding in which our court said, and backed what it said by
what it did, "Peculiar weight is given to the verdict where a view
has been had.."27
Up to this point, it seems indisputable that our court was
committed to the theory that a view is evidence in every respect.
Then, however, came the important case of Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.
v. Allen,2-s which our court, in a recent case 29 hereinafter to be
discussed, seems to regard as a precedent for the ancillary theory.
The Allen case was a condemnation proceeding in which the
jury had viewed the premises. But in that case what the court says
on the question of the evidentiary effect of a view is believed to be
only a dictum, for the reason that the court set aside the verdict on
the ground that the record disclosed "no substantial evidence to
support it." No argument would seem to be needed to convince
anyone that a verdict should be set aside if there is no substantial
23 Id. at 528-529, 96 S.E. at 939. The court here cites the following authori-
ties: "2 Wigmore on Evidence, p. 1372, etc. and authorities there cited; 3 Jones
on Evidence, § 408 etc.; Underhill on Criminal Evidence, § 230; Bishop's New
Criminal Procedure, § 965; Wharton's Criminal Evidence, § 312; People v.
Thorne, 156 N.Y. 286, 42 L.RA. 368."
24 103 W. Va. 186, 136 S.E. 840 (1927). In State v. Lemon, 84 W. Va. 25,
99 S.E. 263 (1919), the court repeated with approval a statement in the McCaus-
land case that, so far as things viewed by the jury on the premises were per-
tinent to show things proper to be proved, they were to be considered by thejury "the same as any other evidence introduced in the case."
25 103 W. Va. at 189, 136 S.E. at 841.
26 109 W. Va. 421, 155 S.E. 174 (1930).
27 Id. at 426, 155 S.E. at 176.
28 113 W. Va. 691, 169 S.E. 610 (1933).
20 State v. Sanders, 125 W. Va. 143, 23 S.E.2d 113 (1942).
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evidence to support it. But our court neither says nor holds in the
Allen case that what the jury observes on a view is not usable at
all as substantive evidence. On the contrary, the court made this
significant statement: "The jury viewed the premises in question.
We are aware that this Court usually accords special weight to
verdicts in such cases .... [the jury] may properly consider what
they observe which is ancillary to the record evidence."30 With
respect to the italicized part of this statement (italics ours), it
should be observed that the court merely says (what is quite obvious
and nothing new) that what the jury observes is ancillary to the
record evidence. Of course, what the jury observes on a view is
ancillary to the record evidence, that is, in aid of the record evi-
dence. But the court said, and that is the important thing, that
the jury "may properly consider what they observe" on a view.
Moreover, the court cited, as authority for this quotation, State v.
McCausland,3 1 which, as heretofore pointed out, unequivocally
espoused the principle that a view is substantive evidence and is to
be considered by the jury "the same as any other evidence."
The court did, however, throw in, quite gratuitously, the fol-
lowing statement which seems to have started all the confusion in
the West Virginia cases: "The view is not for the purpose of pro-
viding essential evidence dehors the record."3 2 Perhaps the most
revealing thing about this statement is the fact that the court cited,
as its sole authority for the proposition, an early California case,
Wright v. Carpenter,33 and the further fact that the court cited an
out-of-state case for the reason that not only does no previous West
Virginia case in point support the proposition, but, as we have
seen, the actual holdings in all the prior West Virginia cases are
contra.
Furthermore, as already indicated in part, the statement is
clearly enough not a necessary part of the court's reasoning, is not
sanctioned by the actual holding in the case, is inconsistent with
prior West Virginia decisions which the court cited with approval,
and is therefore only a dictum. Moreover, it is an extremely weak
dictum for the reason-a rather startling one-that the California
case cited as sole authority for the statement had, many years prior
30 113 W. Va. at 696-697, 169 S.E. at 612. Italics ours.
31 82 W. Va. 525, 96 S.E. 938 (1918).
32 113 W. Va. at 697, 169 S.E. at 612.
33 49 Cal. 607 (1875).
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to the Allen case, been repudiated by the California supreme court 3 4
To be sure, as heretofore indicated, this statement found its
way into the syllabus in the Allen case. But, as our supreme court
has said and held, with respect to another too-broad statement by
the court which had unfortunately found its way into the syllabus:
it (the statement in the syllabus) "is not the law and never has been
in this state": it is not the law for the reason, as the court well put
it, that "the language in the syllabus is broader than the opinion
warrants." 35 In other words, a proposition which would otherwise
be dictum does not become "law" in West Virginia merely because
it is included in the syllabus of a case.36
That this is a warranted explanation of the Allen case is
believed to be fully sustained by our court's holding in what seems
to be the next noteworthy case in point, Thorn v. Addison Brothers
& Smith.3 7 That was a death by wrongful act proceeding in which
the jury had taken a view of the premises and had brought in a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The supreme court refused to
disturb the verdict of the jury, and in so doing, said: "That the
jury was entitled to take into consideration, along with the testi-
mony introduced in the case, what it observed on the view, is well
sustained by our authorities." And as 'an authority sustaining this
proposition the court cited, significantly, the Allen case.38  There-
upon, however, the court quoted the above-discussed statement from
the Allen case that a "view is not to furnish essential evidence
dehors the record." But-and this is believed to be the real core of
the decision-the court's final statement on the point was as follows:
"The view had in this case, and the effort made to represent to the
jury the premises as they were at the time of the accident, were
proper and the jury was warranted in considering that view in
connection with the testimony of witnesses introduced in the
case" 3 9-a statement which clearly treats the view as being in every
respect evidence.
34 See, repudiating the Wright case, People v. Milner, 122 Cal. 171, 185, 54
Pac. 833, 839 (1898). See also 4 WxcmoP.a, EVIDENCE § 1168, that the California
case cited had been repudiated in California.
35 See State v. Graham, 94 W. Va. 67, 117 S.E. 699 (1923), thus commenting
on the syllabus in State v. Burnett, 47 W. Va. 731, 35 S.E. 983 (1900).
36 See Hardman, "The Law"-In West Virginia, 47 W. VA. L.Q. 23 (1940).
37 119 W. Va. 479, 194 S.E. 771 (1987).
38 The court also cited (with approval) most of the prior West Virginia
cases.
39 119 W. Va. at 484, 194 S.E. at 778.
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The next case worthy of discussion is Doman v. Baltimore &
Ohio Ry.40 In that case, an action for damage to the plaintiff's land
resulting allegedly from a construction of a bridge by the defendant,
the jury took a view of the premises and brought in a verdict for
the defendant. The supreme court upheld the verdict. Said the
court: "The jury viewed the land claimed to have been so greatly
damaged, and what they saw, while not in all respects evidence, did
enable them better to understand the testimony given in court." 41
The court cited as authority for this statement, Fox v. Baltimore &
Ohio Ry., and State v. Henry, heretofore discussed, neither of which
cases in its actual holding, sanctions the ancillary theory. Moreover,
the precise holding in the Doman case, which is unquestionably
correct, does not support the proposition.
Perhaps it should be added in passing that in the latest reported
West Virginia case in point, Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v.
Fox,42 the court repeated the dictum in the Doman case, without
comment. The actual decision in the Tennessee Gas case is clearly
sound, and the case therefore does not call for further comment.
There remains only one other decision (apart from the recent
unreported case) which is believed to be noteworthy enough to
justify inclusion in this discussion, viz., the supposedly all-important
case of State v. Sanders,43 which is regarded by many as an authori-
tative precedent sanctioning the ancillary theory. Being the latest
reported case of consequence on the question, it deserves careful
consideration.
The pertinent facts in the Sanders case, a condemnation pro-
ceeding, were as follows: The jury had brought in a verdict based
in part on a view of the premises. The lower court set this verdict
aside on the ground that an instruction given by the court contained
an erroneous statement of the law-a statement which did not in any
way relate to the view; and the supreme court affirmed the action of
the lower court-a sound result.
By way of an obvious dictum, however, the supreme court dis-
cussed at some length a part of the lower court's written opinion
40 125 W. Va. 8, 22 S.E.2d 703 (1942).
41 Id. at 12, 22 S.E.2d at 705.
42 58 S.E.2d 584 (W. Va. 1950).
43 125 W. Va. 143, 23 S.E.2d 113 (1942).
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dealing with the effect of a view. In his written opinion, the trial
judge had stated that he had based his holding (setting aside the
verdict) in part on the knowledge which he had derived from view-
ing the premises. This statement by the lower court raises a point
quite different from the question whether a view by the trier of
fact is to be treated as substantive evidence: it raises, rather, a
problem of how far a judge in setting aside a verdict based in part
on a view may himself rely in part on his own view of the premises.
In fact, the precise problem thus presented in the Sanders case lies
somewhat beyond the scope of this discussion; but it is so closely
related that it is perhaps permissible to say just a word about it.
Indeed, it would seem that essentially the same considerations
should govern both problems; for in both situations the most
plausible objection to giving evidentiary effect to a view is the
fact that such evidence cannot, normally at least, be made a part
of the record for purposes of review by an appellate court. But
this objection to the substantive use of a view as evidence is believed
to be wholly untenable; for, according to present-day methods of
making up a record, there could seldom be an unimpeachable
record prepared for an appellate court if all the evidence usable by
the trier of fact had to be included in the record.
Apropos of the unsoundness of this objection, Wigmore on
Evidence4 4 quotes with approval the following argument by a Texas
court-an unanswerable argument, it is believed:
"[One of the objections to the view as evidence was that it]
cannot be made a part of the record herein. '. . Is it true, or
is it a standard test or even a test at all, that the legality and
admissibility of evidence depends upon the fact that it must
be such as can and must be incorporated into and brought up
with the record? We know of no such rule announced by any
standard work on the law of evidence. If it be true, then the
identification, the pointing out of a defendant in court, is not
legitimate or admissible, because "he cannot be sent up here
with the record." A witness's countenance, tone of voice, mode
and manner of expression, and general demeanor on the stand
oftentimes influence the jury as much in estimating the weight
they give and attach to his testimony as the words he utters, and
'yet they cannot be sent up with record...
4 4 Wlroxm, EVmENcE § 1163.
45 Per White, P. J., in Hart v. State, 15 Tex. App. 202, 228 (1883).
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Another argument against this objection is that cases are tried,
or should be tried, for the purpose of achieving the best possible
results in the first court of record, where most trials end, and should
end, even though the achieving of such results must often deprive
reviewing tribunals of some of the advantages held by the trial
court. Because of the inescapable inperfections inherent in a review
by an appellate tribunal, this is a price we must pay if we hope to
obtain the most socially desirable results in the greatest possible
number of cases.
At any rate, it is submitted that the much-misunderstood
Sanders case decides nothing whatever as to the evidentiary effect
to be given to a view by the trier of fact. Moreover, the essence of
the dictum in the Sanders case is, as stated by the court, that "the
result of a view should not be considered as . . . overcoming a
decidedly clear preponderance [of the evidence] with nothing of
record to justify that course."401 The court also said in the syllabus:
"It is error for the trial judge to set aside a verdict in a condemna-
tion proceeding because information relating to the value of the
land involved gained by him upon a jury view of the premises out-
weighs a clear preponderance of the evidence appearing of record."
[Finally, in order that this discussion may be brought com-
pletely up to date, there should be included here, more or less by
way of an appendix, some reference to a very recent West Virginia
case, Frampton v. Consolidated Bus Lines, which has been decided
since this paper was written. The Frampton case is, as of the time
this discussion is going to press, officially unreported; but, according
to an unofficial report (which is commented upon briefly in the
accompanying footnote) the court says in effect-and seems to hold
-that what a trier of fact observes on a properly conducted view is
in every respect evidence. 47  The case, so far as it deals with the
40 125 W. Va. at 151, 23 S.E.2d at 117.
47 The "unofficial" opinion of the court, per Riley J., contains this pertinent
language: "Defendant's instruction No. 12 was properly given. It simply told
the jury that in arriving at its verdict, in addition to the evidence introduced
by plaintiff and defendant, the jury had a right 'to take into consideration the
view of the point, or points, where said collision happened, and in weighing the
testimony of the witnesses, you [the jurors] have the right to consider the
physical facts ascertained from your view.' This instruction conforms sub.
stantially to the holding of this Court in the case of Thorn, Admr. v. Addison
Bros. & Smith, 119 W. Va. 479, 484, 194 S.E. 771, in which this Court, citing
many West Virginia cases involving the effect of a view by a jury, said at page
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present problem, may well be regarded as having buried, cere-
moniously enough, the corpus delicti of the ancillary theory.
Requiescat in pace!]
It would seem therefore that the various statements in the
cases tending to support the ancillary theory, when read in the light
of the holdings, mean nothing more than that a view, though usable
as substantive evidence, is not proof per se: it is, like most other
evidence, merely a probative datum even though it is, in many if
not most instances, "the very strongest evidence." But the record
evidence may be controlling, or record evidence may be necessary. 4
Also, as in the Sanders case, what a judge observes on a view taken
by both judge and jury is not sufficient countervailing evidence to
justify setting aside a verdict which is supported by "a clear pre-
ponderance of the evidence appearing of record"-supported, too,
presumably, by what the jury observed on the view. And these
statements, so interpreted, are thoroughly defensible.
To sum up, it is believed that the seeming inconsistencies in
the cases are, so far as the holdings go, seeming only and not real,
and that if we look behind form to substance-if we look to the law
484 of the opinion: 'That the jury was entitled to take into consideration, along
with the testimony introduced in the case, what it had observed on the view,
is well sustained by our authorities.'
"This Court in its most recent decision involving the effect of a view by the
jury in the case of Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Fox, W. Va. 1
58 S.E.2d 484, citing and drawing from the opinion in the case of Doman v.
The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 125 V. Va. 8, 22 S.E.2d 703, said: '* * *
and, though the view is not in all respects evidence, it enabled the jury to under-
stand the opinion evidence adduced in court.' By the limitation on the evi-
dentiary effect of the jury view suggested in the Tennessee Gas Transmission
Company and Doman cases, this court did not depart from the position which
prevails in this jurisdiction that a jury view my be considered by a jury,
together with the evidence introduced by plaintiff and defendant. Clearly, in
the sense that matters brought to the attention of the jury on a view of the
premises, the view is evidence. But a jury view will not serve to take from the
party upon whom the burden of proof lies the duty of introducing sufficient
other evidence on which the jury could properly hold that the party upon
whom the burden of proof lies has sustained that burden by evidence other
than the jury view. As well stated in 6 [11, semble) M.J., Jury, Section 65: 'A
view is for the purpose of informing the jurors upon any pertinent inquiry
being made in the trial of a case, and the things which they observe upon such
view, so far as they are pertinent to show anything proper to be proved, are to
be considered by them the same as any other evidence introduced in the case.'"
48 Cf. Riley, J., in Frampton v. Consolidated Bus Lines, supra note 47:
. a jury view will not serve to take from the party upon whom the burden
of proof lies the duty of introducing sufficient other evidence on which the
jury could properly hold that the party upon whom the burden of proof lies
has sustained that burden by evidence other than the jury view."
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actually enforced by the courts, whatever language may be employed
on occasion-our apparently conflicting decisions are reducible to
one simple proposition, namely, that a view by a trier of fact is
substantive evidence and is usable essentially like any other evi-
dence. From this conclusion it would seem to follow that the
ancillary theory, allegedly deducible from the West Virginia deci-
sions, is not so established by the actual holdings in the cases as
"to justify a prediction with reasonable certainty that it will be
enforced by the courts if its authority is challenged." It is sub-
mitted therefore that the ancillary theory is not law in this jurisdic-
tion: it is not an authoritative basis of prediction as to what the
courts will do in fact: it is only a dictum. Judgment non obstante
dicto!
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